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Abstract
This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the busi-
ness cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model
combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When
individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the
risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding ne. Under the empiri-
cally plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits
a su¢ ciently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we
show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger
than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the
tax system displays at tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger
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cits when the economy experiences a recession.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we follow the approach introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) to
study the role played by real technology shocks in driving business uctuation. We will
focus our analysis on the response of government revenue to technology shocks. The
behavior of government revenue over the business cycle has received some attention in
the empirical literature of recent years. It is well known that economic recessions tend
to reduce the tax revenue and this makes di¢ cult for governments to fund their existing
spending programs. Moreover, during expansion periods tax revenue increases and this
creates a new additional political pressure on the government to increase public spend-
ing. Therefore, the empirical analysis of this question focuses on obtaining estimates of
the income elasticity of tax revenue in order to nd out whether tax revenues exhibit
a more than proportional response to output uctuations.1 It is important to distin-
guish between the long-run income elasticity of tax revenue, which shows how revenues
will grow over time as permanent income grows, and the short-run income elasticity
of tax revenue, which shows how much revenues will uctuate over the business cycle.
For instance, Holcombe and Sobel (1997) estimate both the short-run personal income
elasticity of tax revenue and the short-run personal income elasticity of the tax base
for U.S. states and nd that on average they are equal to 1.392 and 1.192 respectively.2
Hence, the average elasticity estimate suggests that a one percent increase in personal
income should result in a 1.4 percent increase in the tax revenue. Recent studies by
Dye and Merriman (2004) and Bruce et al. (2006) provide more accurate estimates
that also support the idea that the short-run personal income elasticity of the tax base
tends to be larger than one.
The main objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical setup that can be con-
sistent with these empirical ndings. The standard Ak growth model with at tax rates
predicts that the government revenue to output ratio remains constant when a technol-
ogy (or total factor productivity) shock takes place. Under at tax rates, a technology
1See Dye (2004) for a review of this literature.
2Researchers distinguish between two tax measures when estimating elasticities: the tax base or the
tax revenue. Tax revenue data by the type of tax is easily available for several developed countries but
they can embed tax rate changes and this leads to a bias in the short-run elasticity estimator.
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shock a¤ects symmetrically output and government revenue since government revenue
is a constant proportion of output. Therefore, the standard Ak growth model with at
tax rates does not o¤er a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence as the value
of the short-run income elasticity of tax revenue predicted by the model is equal to one.
There are several candidate explanations for the high empirical income elasticity
of tax revenue. One obvious explanation consists of dispensing with the assumption
of constant marginal tax rates and considering instead a progressive tax schedule on
income. Clearly, as the average tax rates increase with income the government revenue
will increase more than the aggregate income.
Another alternative explanation for the high income elasticity of government rev-
enue relies on the behavioral responses to income shocks. When the economy deteri-
orates, individuals might increase their savings and reduce consumption, especially of
items like durable goods. Then, after the economy starts to recover, they might make
some of the purchases that had previously been put o¤ during the recession. If the
government collect taxes on consumption, then the previous behavior of consumption
along the business results in a high elasticity of revenue.
In this paper we provide an alternative mechanism generating the desired pattern
of cyclicality of government revenue. This mechanism complements the previous ones
since relies exclusively on a di¤erent assumption, namely, the existence of tax evasion
under a at tax rate on income. We will show that even this simple tax structure is able
to generate an income elasticity of tax revenue larger than one under serially correlated
productivity shocks when the value of the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES, henceforth) is larger than one. Of course, under a progressive tax
system our mechanism based on tax evasion will reinforce the previous result and, thus,
the government revenue will overshoot even more as a response to a productivity shock.
The same can be said if taxes were imposed on other procyclical endogenous variables
like consumption. Note that our model displays an income elasticity of government
revenue larger than one even for economies having tax systems characterized by at
tax rates.3
3 In this respect, it should be mentioned that during the last decade some countries made an impor-
tant reform of their system of income taxation. They replaced their previous progressive tax structure
by a pure at tax rate. For instance, Russia, Serbia, Iraq, Slovakia and Ukraine set a at tax rate of
13%, 14%, 15%, 19% and 13%, respectively.
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In order to endow the standard Ak growth model with tax evasion, we assume that
individuals have to choose in each period the amount of income they want to consume
and the amount of income they want to evade. When individuals conceal part of their
true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of
paying the corresponding ne. Both taxes and nes determine individual saving and
the rate of capital accumulation. Thus, two types of shocks coexist in this model:
the aggregate shock, which is given by changes in the total factor productivity of the
economy and the idiosyncratic shock, which is introduced by means of the tax inspection
policy. The main result of our analysis says that, when technology shocks are serially
correlated, the value of the IES fully determines the behavior of the government revenue
to GDP ratio. In particular, when the inverse of IES is larger than one, the government
revenue increases more than output in the presence of a positive technology shock. In
this case, the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to GDP is larger than one, which is
consistent with the aforementioned empirical regularity. Moreover, when either the IES
is equal to one or technology shocks are not serially correlated, the unitary elasticity of
tax revenue is recovered. The intuition of this result lies in the fact that, when shocks
are serially correlated, an increase in current total factor productivity means that the
expected total productivity and, thus, the expected return of investment in the next
period will be higher. Therefore, saving will increase or decrease depending on the
value of the IES. Moreover, under tax evasion, underreporting the true income is also
a mechanism that allows individuals to transfer present income to the future. This
means that, if individuals decide to save more (less) as a response to a real business
shock they will also decide to evade more (less) taxes and this will result in less (more)
revenues raised by the government.
In the next section we develop the basic dynamic model of tax evasion. In Section
3, we will discuss the implications of a technology shock on the government revenue to
GDP ratio. In section 4, we extend our model to cope with the implications for the
budget decits run by the government. Some nal remarks conclude the paper.
2. The Model
Let us consider a competitive economy in discrete time with a continuum of ex-ante
identical individuals who are uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1] : Each indi-
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vidual i has access to a common technology represented by the production function
yi;t = Atki;t where At > 0 is the random total factor productivity (TFP), yi;t is the
output per capita of individual i and ki;t is the capital per capita of individual i in
period t.4 We assume that capital fully depreciates after one period.
We assume that the stochastic process of strictly positive TFP shocks fAtg follow
a logarithmic autoregressive process,
lnAt+1 =  lnAt + ut+1; (2.1)
where  2 [0; 1] and ut+1 is i.i.d. and normally distributed with zero mean and variance
2: Note that the realization of TFP shocks are the same for all individuals. Therefore,
production is exposed to macroeconomic (or non-idiosyncratic) TFP shocks.
Output can be devoted to either consumption or investment. After production has
taken place, each individual i decides both his consumption ci;t and the amount xi;t of
declared income, and then pays the corresponding income tax at the rate  2 (0; 1) : If
he is inspected by the tax enforcement agency, the total amount of unreported income
is discovered and the taxpayer has to pay a penalty at the at rate  > 1; which
is imposed on the amount of evaded taxes (as in Yitzhaki, 1974).5 Inspection of a
particular individual is an event that occurs with probability p 2 (0; 1) :We also assume
that p < 1 in order to ensure positive tax evasion.
The amount of output remaining after consumption has taken place and taxes and
(potential) penalties have been paid constitutes the capital stock ki;t+1 that is used
for production in the next period. Therefore, the budget constraint of an audited
individual is
Atki;t   xi;t    (Atki;t   xi;t) = ci;t + ki;t+1;
whereas the budget constraint of a non-audited individual is
Atki;t   xi;t = ci;t + ki;t+1:
We assume that the amount of taxes collected by the tax agency is devoted to
nancing government spending that enters into the instantaneous utility of individuals
4See Rebelo (1991) for a model where the Ak production function arises endogenously when physical
and human capital are perfect substitutes. In this case the capital stock k embodies both types of
capital.
5 If the penalty rate  were smaller than one, tax evasion would be encouraged by the tax authority.
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in an additive way. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution of private consumption
between two arbitrary periods is not a¤ected by the level of government spending. Since
consumers take as given the path of government spending, the utility accruing from this
spending can be suppressed from the consumersobjective function. Individuals are
assumed to maximize the following expected discounted sum of instantaneous utilities:
1X
s=0
tEt [U (ci;t+s)] ; (2.2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and Et [] is the conditional expectation given the
information available at period t. We assume that the instantaneous utility function is
isoelastic,
U (ci;t) =
(ci;t)
1 
1   ;
where the parameter value  plays the usual double role as the value of the (constant)
relative risk aversion index and as the value of the inverse of the IES.
The amount of unreported income in period t for each individual i is i;t = Atki;t   xi;t :
Hence, we can use the previous budget constraints to write the stochastic law of motion
of capital per capita as
ki;t+1 =
8>><>>:
(1  )Atki;t   ci;t   (   1)i;t; with probability p;
(1  )Atki;t   ci;t + i;t; with probability (1  p);
or, equivalently,
ki;t+1 = (1  )Atki;t   ci;t + i;thi; (2.3)
where hi is a random variable with the following probability function:
f (hi) =
8>><>>:
p for h = 1  ;
1  p for h = 1;
(2.4)
for all i 2 [0; 1] : Moreover, the variables hi are independently distributed across indi-
viduals. Note that E (hi) = 1  p > 0 as we have assumed that p < 1. We dene the
net true income per capita as
ni;t = (1  )Atki;t: (2.5)
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Then, using (2:3) we can write ni;t+1 as
ni;t+1 = (1  )At+1 (ni;t   ci;t + i;thi) : (2.6)
Taking ni;t as the state variable for individual i in period t, and ci;t and i;t as the
control variables, the Bellman equation for the stochastic dynamic problem faced by
this individual in period t before knowing if he is going to be audited or not is
V (ni;t) = Maxfci;t; i;tg
(
(ci;t)
1 
1   + Et [V (ni;t+1)]
)
; (2.7)
where ni;t+1 satises (2:6) : It is well known that the value function for this problem
is the isoelastic function, V (ni;t) = D1  (ni;t)
1  with D > 0 (see Hakansson, 1970):
Therefore, using (2:6) and computing the conditional expectation Et [V (ni;t+1)], the
optimization problem faced by a taxpayer with initial after-tax true income ni;t becomes
Max
fci;t; i;tg
(
(ci;t)
1 
1   + Et

D
1   [(1  )At+1 (ni;t   ci;t + i;thi)]
1 
)
; (2.8)
Di¤erentiating with respect to the control variables ci;t and i;t; we obtain the following
rst order conditions for the previous problem:
(ci;t)
  = DEt
h
((1  )At+1)1  (ni;t   ci;t + i;thi) 
i
; (2.9)
and
Et

[(1  )At+1 (ni;t   ci;t + i;thi)]  hi

= 0: (2.10)
Using the independency between At+1 and hi and the distribution of the random vari-
able hi given in (2:4) ; condition (2:9) becomes
(ci;t)
  = D(1  )1 t

(1  p) (ni;t   ci;t + i;t)  + p (ni;t   ci;t +  (1  ) i;t)

;
(2.11)
with
t  Et
h
(At+1)
1 
i
;
while condition (2:10) becomes
(1  p) (ni;t   ci;t + i;t)  = p (   1) (ni;t   ci;t +  (1  ) i;t)  : (2.12)
Solving for ci;t and i;t in the system composed of equations (2:11) and (2:12), we obtain
ci;t = tni;t; (2.13)
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and
i;t =


(ni;t   ci;t); (2.14)
where
t =
1
1 +
 
D(1  )1 t

(1  p)(1 + )  + p (1  (   1)) 1= ; (2.15)
and
 =

1 p
p( 1)
1=   1
1 + (   1)

1 p
p( 1)
1= > 0: (2.16)
Applying the envelope theorem, that is, U 0(ci;t) = V 0 (ni;t) ; it must hold that
c i;t = Dn
 
i;t : (2.17)
Substituting (2:13) in (2:17) and using (2:15) we obtain
D =
1
1 +
 
D(1  )1 t

(1  p) (1 + )  + p (1  (   1)) 1= :
Therefore, solving for D in the previous equation we get
D =
"
1
1  ((1  )1 tH)1=
#
; (2.18)
where
H = (1  p) (1 + )  + p (1  (   1))  :
Substituting (2:18) into (2:15) ; and using (2:13), and (2:14) ; we get the following
consumption and evasion policies:
ci;t =
h
1   (1  )1 Ht1=ini;t; (2.19)
and
i;t =


 
(1  )1 Ht
1=
ni;t: (2.20)
Note that, when p = 1, we have that  = 0 and, hence, H = 1. Therefore, when
p = 1; individuals do not evade taxes, i;t = 0 for all i 2 [0; 1] : Moreover, under this
full enforcement policy conducted by the tax agency, the optimal consumption policy
is the one appearing in absence of tax evasion,
ci;t =
h
1   (1  )1 t1=i (1  )Atki;t:
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In order to obtain the value of the aggregate after-tax true income nt+1 in equilib-
rium, which is given by (2:6) ; we compute
nt+1 =
Z
[0;1]
ni;t+1di = (1  )At+1
"Z
[0;1]
ni;tdi 
Z
[0;1]
ci;tdi+ 
Z
[0;1]
i;thidi
#
= (1  )At+1
"Z
[0;1]
ni;tdi 
Z
[0;1]
ci;tdi+ 
 Z
[0;1]
i;tdi
! Z
[0;1]
hidi
!#
= (1  )At+1 [nt   ct +  (1  p) t] ;
where the third equality follows from the independence between the variables hi and
i;t at the beginning of period t; whereas the last equality comes from the law of large
numbers for a continuum of i.i.d. random variables, according to which
R
[0;1] hidi =
E (hi) = 1   p; and from the denitions of aggregate consumption ct 
R
[0;1] ci;tdi,
aggregate evasion t 
R
[0;1] i;tdi; and aggregate after-tax true income nt 
R
[0;1] ni;tdi.
In consequence, as follows from (2:19) and (2:20) ; the aggregate values of consumption
and evaded income are
ct =

1   (1  )1 Ht1=| {z }
t
nt; (2.21)
and
t =


 
(1  )1 Ht
1=
nt =


(1  t)nt: (2.22)
In order to analyze the e¤ect of a TFP shock on evaded income and on consumption,
we must compute the value of t: Given that the random variable ut+1 is normal
and thus the technology shock At+1 is log-normal, the conditional expectation t 
Et
h
(At+1)
1 
i
is equal to
t = A
(1 )
t exp

(1  )22
2

: (2.23)
The next section discusses the e¤ect of a TFP shock on both the amount of evaded
income and the government revenue to GDP ratio.
3. E¤ects of TFP shocks
In order to analyze the e¤ect of a technology shock on government revenue to output
ratio, we should rst compute the e¤ect of an increase of the TFP value At on the
evasion to income ratio t=yt: Since aggregate output satises yt = Atkt and the the
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after-tax aggregate income is nt = (1  )Atkt = (1  ) yt , we substitute (2:23) into
(2:22) to obtain the fraction of evaded income,
t
yt
=



H (1  )A(1 )t exp

(1  )22
2
1=
: (3.1)
The next preposition summarizes the impact of a variation of At on the amount of
evaded income to GDP ratio t=yt :
Proposition 3.1. (a) Assume that  > 0: Then,
@ (t=yt)
@At
R 0 if  Q 1:
(b) Assume that  = 0: Then,
@ (t=yt)
@At
= 0:
Proof : (a) It follows directly from (3:1) since  > 0 and H > 0:
(b) When  = 0, At+1 does not depend on At and, hence, t = exp
 
(1  )22=2.
Therefore, the ratio t=yt is not a¤ected by TFP shocks.
The intuition of this result comes directly from the assumption made about the
utility function. Recall that the parameter  measures the inverse of IES. When  > 1
individuals have a strong preference for consumption smoothing so that, if the expected
return from saving increases, then they decide to decrease the fraction of income saved
so as to preserve a low discrepancy between present and future consumption. Under
positive autocorrelation,  > 0; a high value At of the total factor productivity in period
t; implies a large expected value At+1 of the shock in the period t+1: This results in a
higher expected return from saving and then individuals decide optimally to reduce the
saving to income ratio. Note that in our setup with tax evasion individuals decrease
the fraction of income transferred to the next period through the two channels at their
disposal. On the one hand, they reduce the direct fraction of their income devoted to
capital accumulation and, on the other hand, they reduce the fraction t=yt of evaded
income. Note in this respect that in our model tax evasion is a risky investment with
positive expected return as E (hi) = 1   p > 0: The opposite argument applies when
 < 1: In this latter case, a rise of the expected return At+1 from saving triggers a
larger capital accumulation and larger tax evasion since individuals are not as concerned
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about consumption smoothing. As the substitution e¤ect between present and future
consumption is the dominating force in explaining the saving decision in this case, a
large value of At results in a larger expected value of At+1 and, hence, the fraction of
saving out of present income should increase.
The previous argument does not apply when the technology shocks are not serially
correlated since then current shocks do not a¤ect the expected future shocks. Therefore,
when a technology shock takes place in this case, both the true net income nt and the
output yt increase and, because of the assumption of isoelastic preferences, aggregate
evasion and output rise in the same proportion so that the evasion to income ratio t=yt
remains constant.
Finally, when  = 1 (that is, when the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic),
the consumption policy (2:21) is equal to
ct = (1  )nt;
for all  2 [0; 1] since t = 1 and H = 1 in this case (see (2:21)). Note that this
consumption policy obtained under logarithmic preferences is independent of the para-
meters p and  characterizing the tax enforcement. Therefore, the impact of a variation
in the tax enforcement policy is totally absorbed by the amount of unreported income
for given values of both the tax rate  and the capital stock kt: Moreover, when  = 1;
the proportion of saving is independent of the expected return from capital and, thus,
the fraction t=yt of evaded income is una¤ected by contemporaneous TFP shocks.
The total government revenue Rt is given by the taxes that consumers voluntary
pay plus the amount of evaded taxes and the corresponding penalty paid by inspected
individuals,
Rt = xt + p(yt   xt);
which can be rewritten as
Rt = yt   (1  p)t:
Therefore, the government revenue to GDP ratio Rt=yt equals to
Rt
yt
= 

1  (1  p) t
yt

: (3.2)
The e¤ect of a TFP shock on the government revenue to GDP ratio is given in the
following proposition:
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Proposition 3.2. (a) Assume that  > 0: Then,
@ (Rt=yt)
@At
R 0 if  R 1:
(b) Assume that  = 0: Then,
@ (Rt=yt)
@At
= 0:
Proof : It is immediate from Proposition 3.1 and equation (3:2).
We have just shown that a technology shock not only a¤ects the output per capita
but also the government revenue to GDP ratio. The intuition of this result lies in the
behavior of the evasion ratio t=yt when At changes. As Proposition 3.1 shows, the
e¤ect of a positive TFP shock on the fraction t=yt of evaded income depends on the
value taken by the parameter . When  > 1, the fraction t=yt of evaded income
decreases and, therefore, the government revenue to output ratio increases.
In this framework, the capital kt is given at the beginning of each period t. Then,
the output at time t is only a¤ected by the uctuations of the technology shock At.
Therefore, knowing the sign of the e¤ect of a TFP shock on the government revenue
to GDP ratio is the equivalent knowing whether the elasticity of tax revenue with
respect to output is larger, equal or lower than one. Empirical evidence shows that the
estimates of this elasticity are generally larger than one. This model can reproduce this
fact when  > 1 and technology shocks are serially correlated ( > 0). It is important
to stress the crucial role played by tax evasion since, in the case where consumers are
honest (that is, when p = 1), a TFP shock will only a¤ect the output per capita but
not the ratio Rt=yt, since this ratio is simply equal to  (see (3:2) :
4. Government budget and growth rates
In order to extend the scope of our results, we will discus some potential scenarios
concerning the behavior of government spending that give raise in turn to some insights
about the procyclical or countercyclical nature of government decits. There is a large
number of empirical studies that use data from developing countries to suggest that
government spending tends to be procyclical.6 The articles by Gavin and Perotti (1997),
6A procyclical scal policy is dened as the reduction in public spending (or an increase in taxes)
during recessions and increases in public spending (or reductions in taxes) during expansions.
11
Stein et al. (1999), Braun (2001), Kamisky et al. (2004), Akitoby et al. (2004)
and Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) are some examples of papers that nd a positive
relationship between public spending and GDP.
Let us rst analyze the implications of TFP shocks on the stochastic rate of en-
dogenous growth of our Ak-type economy. The net rate gt+1 of growth of GDP per
capita from t to t+ 1 satises
1 + gt+1 =
yt+1
yt
=
At+1kt+1
Atkt
: (4.1)
We obtain evolution of the aggregate capital kt+1 as follows:
kt+1 = (1  )Atkt   ct + (1  p)t
= (1  )Atkt   ct + (1  p)

(nt   ct)
= (1  )Atkt   (1 + (1  p)) ct + (1  p)nt
= (1  )Atkt   (1 + (1  p)) t (1  )Atkt + (1  p) (1  )Atkt
= (1  ) (1  t) (1 + (1  p))Atkt: (4.2)
where the rst equality comes from (2.3), the second comes from (2.14), the third from
collecting terms, and the fourth comes from the policy function (2.21) for consumption
and from the denition of nt in (2.5). Note that we have applied the law of large
numbers in all these equalities. Therefore, the gross rate of growth becomes
1 + gt+1 = At+1 (1  ) (1  t) (1 + (1  p))
= At+1 (1  )
 
(1  )1 Ht
1=
(1 + (1  p))
= At+1 (1  )

(1  )1 HA(1 )t exp

(1  )22
2
1=
(1 + (1  p))
= At+1 [(1  )H]1= A(1 )=t (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1  )22
2

; (4.3)
where the rst equality comes from (4.1) and (4.2), the second comes from the expres-
sion of t in (2.21), the third from the expression of t in (2.23), and the fourth from
some simplication. Note that the rate of growth from t to t+ 1 depends not only on
the realization of the technology shock At+1 at t + 1 but also on the shock At at t:
Taking into account in (4.3) that
Et (At+1) = At e
2=2;
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we can easily compute the expected future rate of growth at t;
Et (1 + gt+1) = [(1  )H]1= A=t (1 + (1  p)) exp
  
1   + 22
2
!
(4.4)
All the unexpected increases in the rate of growth from t to t+1 are fully explained
by the realization of the technological shock At+1: To see this, we can simply use (4.3)
and (4.4) to compute the following ratio between the actual and the expected gross
rates of growth:
1 + gt+1
Et (1 + gt+1)
=
At+1
At e
2=2
:
We see that the the rate of economic growth is larger (smaller) than the expected rate
if and only if At+1 > (<)A

t e
2=2 = Et (At+1) :
After establishing the connection of TFP shocks and the rate of economic growth
under tax evasion, we can analyze the potential implications of these shocks for govern-
ment spending and scal decits. Let us rst assume that the government can adjust
instantaneously its own spending and wants to keep the government spending to out-
put ratio constant, which is equivalent to xing a unitary elasticity of public spending
with respect to GDP. In this case, the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio
fully characterizes the path of scal decits or scal surpluses. We know that, under
serially correlated TFP shocks ( > 0); a positive technology shock has a larger e¤ect
on the tax revenue to GDP ratio than on the public spending to GDP ratio if  > 1.
Therefore, the budget decit decreases. However, when  < 1 a positive TFP shock
results in a larger budget decit. Note that when either  = 1 or  = 0; the government
budget does not vary as a response to a TFP shock. Nevertheless, when the elasticity
of government spending with respect to output is larger than one and  > 0, scal
decits can arise whatever value  takes.7 For  < 1 and  = 1 a positive technology
shock gives rise to a scal decit, while in the case of  > 1 decits or surpluses may
appear depending on the specic value of both the elasticity of public spending and the
elasticity of tax revenue.
Another scenario where government spending is adjusted instantaneously appears
when government is committed to devoting all tax revenue to nancing public spending.
Obviously, in this case government decits are not a¤ected by TFP shocks. This setup
7Akitoby et al. (2004) estimated the long and short term elasticity of government spending and
output and found that this elasticity is on average greater than 1.
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can be interpreted as the extreme case of the model developed by Talvi and Végh
(2005) where the government comes under political pressure to increase public spending
when tax revenue increases. In the setup of our paper the value of parameter  will
determine the magnitude of the elasticity of public spending with respect to output.
In particular, when  > 1 the elasticity of government revenue with respect to the
output is larger than one. However, this scenario is not supported by data since the
elasticity of government spending exhibits empirical values larger than one but smaller
than those of the elasticity of government revenue (see Akitoby et al., 2004).
We next present an scenario where the amount of government spending is set one
period in advance as it occurs, for instance, when this spending is mostly devoted to
infrastructure building. In this case, there is an obvious lag from the period at which
the spending decision is taken to the period where the infrastructure is fully operative.
Alternatively, we can assume that the government (or the corresponding legislative
body) has to approve the spending budget for the next period and, once the budget bill
is passed, no further changes in the amount of spending are feasible during the next
period. Due to this lag in the government spending decision, the spending to GDP
ratio will uctuate with the business cycle. Thus, the objective of the government will
be to keep the expected government spending to GDP ratio as close as possible to
its exogenous target value  2 (0; 1). More precisely, we assume that the government
sets in each period the government spending in the next period so as to minimize the
expected square of the deviation of the government spending to GDP ratio from the
exogenous constant ratio target . We maintain in this framework the assumption of
constant tax rates, which in turn also gives raise to uctuations in total government
revenues.
The objective of the government in period t  1 is thus to choose the amount Gt of
spending in period t to minimize
Et 1

Gt
yt
  
2
;
This objective is fully achieved when Et 1 (Gt/ yt) = ; that is, when
Gt =

Et 1
 
y 1t
 = 
Et 1

[(1 + gt)yt 1] 1
 = yt 1
Et 1

[1 + gt)]
 1
 (4.5)
To compute explicitly the denominator of the previous expression, we rst get from
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(4.3) that
(1 + gt)
 1 =
A 1t
[(1  )H]1= A(1 )=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1 )22
2

so that
Et 1

[1 + gt)]
 1

=
Et 1
 
A 1t

[(1  )H]1= A(1 )=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1 )22
2

=
A t 1e
2=2
[(1  )H]1= A(1 )=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1 )22
2

=
1
[(1  )H]1= A=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1 3+2)2
2
 ; (4.6)
where the second equality comes from the fact that
Et 1
 
A 1t

= A t 1e
2=2;
and the third comes from some straightforward simplication.
Therefore, using (4.5) and (4.6), the amount of government spending in date t is
Gt =
yt 1
Et 1

[1 + gt)]
 1
 = At 1kt 1
Et 1

[1 + gt)]
 1

= At 1kt 1 [(1  )H]1= A=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1  3 + 2)2
2

= A
(+)=
t 1 kt 1 [(1  )H]1= (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1  3 + 2)2
2

:
Note that the government spending in t depends on the values of two variables known
a t  1; namely, the capital kt 1 and the the TFP shock At 1:
Concerning the e¤ective government spending to GDP ratio in period t, note that
Gt
yt
=
Gt
(1 + gt)yt 1
=

(1 + gt)Et 1

[1 + gt)]
 1
 =
 [(1  )H]1= A=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1 3+2)2
2

At [(1  )H]1= A(1 )=t 1 (1 + (1  p)) exp

(1 )22
2
 = At 1e 2=2
At
; (4.7)
where the second equality comes from (4.5) and the third from (4.3) and (4.6).
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As we have shown in the previous section, the government revenue to GDP ratio can
uctuate in each period t with the technological shock At in the presence of tax evasion
(i.e., when p < 1) even if the tax rate remains constant across periods (see (4.9)).
Moreover, we have just seen in this section that the government spending to output
ratio at t also uctuates with the shock At as the amount of government spending was
decided in period t  1:
Concerning the scal decit to GDP ratio, we can compute Gt Rtyt from (4:7) and
(4:9) : Note from (4:7) that the government spending to GDP ratio strictly decreases
with the innovation shock in At: However, the government revenue to output ratio
increases (decreases) with the innovation shock in At if  > 1(< 1) when  > 0; while
it does not vary with At if either  = 0 or  = 1: Therefore, we get the following result:
Proposition 4.1. For a given value of At 1; the government decit to output ratio
Gt Rt
yt
is decreasing in the value At of TFP if   1 and  > 0. Moreover, the same
result holds for all  > 0 when  = 0.
Proof : Note that, if   1 and  > 0; then the government revenue to output ratio
weakly increases with At and, since the government spending to GDP ratio strictly
decreases with At for a given value of At 1; the result immediately follows. When
 = 0; the government decit is decreasing since the government revenue to output
ratio is not a¤ected by changes in At; while the government spending to output ratio
strictly decreases with At for a given value of At 1:
The previous result agrees with the empirical evidence since tell us that, under the
empirically relevant case with   1 and  > 0; scal decits increase when the current
rate of growth is lower than the expected one. Note in this respect that, as we have
shown at the beginning of this section, the deviation of the actual rate of growth in
period t and its expectation at t   1 for a given value At 1 in period t   1 is fully
explained by the realization At of the TFP in period t: However, for the empirically
most implausible case  < 1; if TFP shocks are positively correlated,  > 0; the overall
e¤ect on the public decit to GDP ratio is ambiguous. In this case the revenue to GDP
ratio decreases when there is a positive shock on TFP, which coupled with the decrease
in the government spending to GDP ratio, gives raise to an ambiguous e¤ect on the
government decit to output ratio.
16
Let us nish this section with some comments about the selection of the tax rate
when the amount of government spending is chosen a period in advance. Note that we
have bee implicitly assuming in our previous analysis that the selection of tax rates is
subject to less discretion than government spending, that is, that tax rates are set for
longer periods than the amount of government spending. In fact, we were making the
extreme assumption that the value of the tax rate was exogenously given. One way of
rationalize this assumption and make it consistent with balanced budget in the long
run consists of assuming that the government (or the legislative body) chooses at date
0, before observing any technological shock, the tax rate in order to minimization of
the unconditional expected square of the government decit to output ratio. Therefore,
the objective of the government is to choose the tax rate  in order to minimize
E

Gt  Rt
yt
2
This target is fully achieved achieved when
E

Rt
yt

= E

Gt
yt

;
which according to the government spending objective becomes
E

Rt
yt

= : (4.8)
as, from the law of iterated expectations, E (Gt/ yt) = E (Et 1 (Gt/ yt)) = . Combin-
ing (3:2) with (3:1) we obtain the government revenue to GDP ratio
Rt
yt
=    (1  p) [H(1  )]1= A(1 )=t exp
 
(1  )2 2
2
!
: (4.9)
The unconditional expectation (i.e., the expectation at the initial date 0 before observ-
ing any realization of the TFP shock) of the previous government revenue to GDP ratio
can be easily computed by taking into account the following unconditional expectation:
E

A
(1 )=
t

= exp
 
2 (1  )2 2
22 (1  2)
!
:
Plugging the previous expression in the unconditional expectation of the ratio (4:9) ;
we get
E

Rt
yt

=    (1  p) [H(1  )]1= exp
 
2 (1  )2 2
22 (1  2)
!
exp
 
(1  )2 2
2
!
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=    (1  p) [H(1  )]1= exp
 
(1  )2 2
2

1 +
2
(1  2) 
!
:
It is immediate to see that the previous expectation is strictly increasing in the tax
rate and tends to 1 as  converges to 1 and to a negative number when  approaches 0.
Thererefore, there exists a unique value  of the tax rate solving the equation (4.8) for
 2 (0; 1). This is the tax rate that balances the government budget in (unconditional)
expected terms and that is kept constant for all periods in our analysis.
5. Final Remarks
In this paper, we have shown that, by introducing tax evasion in the standard Ak
model growth with at tax rates, it is possible to obtain an elasticity of tax revenue
with respect to output larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence.
Therefore, tax evasion o¤ers by itself an explanation to the high income elasticity of
government revenue that complements other explanations relying either on progressive
income taxation or on taxes imposed on procyclical variables. we have extended the
model to account for the cyclical behavior of scal decits when government has a
target concerning the value of its spending relative to GDP. we show that, under a
plausible parameter restriction, scal decits become larger in recessions.
We have used for our analysis a very simple model of capital accumulation where the
static portfolio choice model of tax evasion presented by Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
has been extended to a dynamic setup.8 In this framework, consumersdecisions about
how much income they want to report not only a¤ect their present consumption but
also their future consumption. Therefore, the response of consumers to positive TFP
shocks a¤ects both the tax evasion decision and government revenue. In this setup, we
have shown how the e¤ect of a positive technology shock on the government revenue
to GDP ratio is fully characterized by the value of IES parameter when TFP shocks
are serially correlated. In particular when the IES exhibits a su¢ ciently small value,
a positive technology shock makes individuals to lower more than proportionally their
amount of evaded income in order to maintain a smooth path of consumption over time.
Therefore, the government revenue increases more than output and in consequence the
income elasticity of tax revenue becomes larger than one.
8See Lin andYang (2001) for a similar context.
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